Introduction
This article examines the current strengths and remaining sources of vulnerability in Malaysia as well as the challenges for the future. It shows that the recovery in the Malaysian economy since 1998 has been due mainly to exports, resilient private consumption, and a boost in public spending, amid lower investment level. GDP growth is at present at a more moderate level of around 5-6 per cent, thereby reducing concerns of overheating, which was a main issue during the crisis. The article argues that Malaysia is unlikely to return to the rapid growth of over 9.0 per cent, as in the pre-crisis period, given the changing and more challenging global economic landscape. The increasing global competition is making it more difficult to attract FDI and expand the export markets.
The article shows that the financial sector has become more resilient following the bank mergers and the reform measures, including better risk management practices. Like other Asian countries, Malaysia has accumulated high levels of foreign reserves, which has reduced the country's vulnerability to speculative behaviour by international investors. However, an important source of vulnerability remains on the trade side. The country's trade pattern has changed slowly, with exports still fairly concentrated on electronics products. In terms of main trade partners, Malaysia has grown less sensitive to the USA and more sensitive to East Asia, especially China, in recent times. But given its high dependency on trade and the large trade flows between the USA and China, any significant slowdown in the US economy could hit Malaysia in a major way, despite recent diversification in its main export markets.
The article is divided in six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 describes growth and external sector performance in Malaysia. Section 3 discusses the reforms in the financial sector, and Section 4 the recent trends in capital flows and developments in the capital account. Section 5 discusses vulnerabilities originating from internal imbalances, while Section 6 concludes and offers policy suggestions for reducing vulnerability. Source Asian Development Bank (ADB).
1998. The growth recovery was quite bumpy as the Malaysian economy was affected by the collapse of the internet bubble in 2001. GDP growth was almost flat at 0.3 per cent in 2001, but growth rebounded thereafter when the downturn stabilised and the electronics sector recovered. From 2002-5, economic growth averaged at about 5.6 per cent, which paled in comparison to the average of more than 9.0 per cent prior to the crisis. A major reason behind the slower GDP growth was the slack in investment activity, as the private sector had gone through painful restructuring phases after the crisis. It was only in 2003 that private investment started regaining some strength. Even with the crisis, Malaysia's unemployment rate has remained low compared with its neighbours (Table 1) , due to the already tight labour market prior to the crisis. The manufacturing and services sectors have been the key drivers of growth after the crisis ( Table 2 ).
The recovery in the Malaysian economy since 1998 was generally attributed to the recovery in exports, resilient private consumption and a boost in public spending (Table 3) . As a major exporter in electronics products, the rise in the demand for microchips and IT products has boosted Malaysia's exports of electronics. Since more than 50 per cent of Malaysia's exports are made-up of electronics products, total export growth has also exhibited fast growth. As a result of a weaker ringgit exchange rate, which plunged by more than 40 per cent against the US dollar in 1998, exporters of primary commodities such as petroleum, gas and palm oil have gained significantly in local currency from their US dollar export earnings.
The 1998 crisis saw many companies closing down or having to restructure their operations by disposing of their non-core activities and cutting the workforce. The crisis also revealed the over-exposure of investment in some sectors such as construction in office buildings and residential properties. Private investment has since dropped to about half the precrisis level relative to GDP, while public investment's share has increased due to the fiscal stimulus to revive the economy (Table 3 ). It appears that the current investment level is adequate to generate moderate growth of around 5-6 per cent, which is nearer to Malaysia's potential growth path and is more sustainable.
Sustainability of FDI
Owing to the rising competition from China and India, there are concerns over the sustainability of the foreign investment level. The corporate tax rate will be reduced by one percentage point per year in The private sector will continue to be the key driver to Malaysia's growth, with the public sector complementing and facilitating the process. A recent news article reported that the government had spent more than RM11 billion to take over or rescue seven ailing privatised projects in the past five years (New Straits Times, 14 December 2006). These failed projects are mainly infrastructure projects that will only generate returns over the long term. This affair also suggests that the private sector is still not totally healed as it struggles to get rid of debts and in extreme cases, is bailed out by the government. Due to budget limitations, the government can only salvage projects of public interest that are still viable under proper management. To foster and facilitate private sector growth, measures adopted have included improving the government delivery system, giving tax incentives, modernising the agriculture sector, identifying and promoting new sources of growth, and uplifting the quality of human capital. In addition, the government has initiated the National Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Development Blueprint, which has outlined the objectives, strategies and action plans to accelerate the development of the SMEs in the country.
Strong reliance on foreign trade
The Malaysian economy is highly dependent on trade, with trade-to-GDP ratio reaching about 200 per cent since the late 1990s. This means that the economy remains vulnerable to the global business cycle, particularly the growth performance in developed countries that are Malaysia's main export markets. The traditional top four major markets for Malaysia's exports in 2005 were USA (19.7 per cent), Europe (11.7 per cent), Japan (9.4 per cent) and Singapore (15.6 per cent). Exports to Singapore are not all meant for the local market and could possibly reach other developed countries as their final destinations. China and India are increasingly becoming important export markets for Malaysia. China's share has increased from 2.4 per cent in 1996 to 6.6 per cent in 2005, as a result of an average export growth of 25.0 per cent per year to China (Table 6 ). Over time, Malaysia's direction of exports has not structurally changed much in terms of shares, except for a few notable countries such as China and India.
Manufactured exports continue to be Malaysia's main export item. The large share of electrical and electronics (E&E) products at 53.0 per cent of total exports in 2005 (Table 5 ) is a source of vulnerability to export performance and economic growth. Export growth is significantly affected by the movements in the global electronics cycle. This was seen in 2001 when the internet market crashed, which resulted in total exports falling by 10.6 per cent. Imports fell by 10.3 per cent because a large share of imports was intermediate inputs for the E&E sector. Nonetheless, some export diversification has taken place, with agriculture and mining making up 7.0 per cent and 9.8 per cent of exports in 2005, respectively, thus partly compensating for weaknesses arising from a down-cycle in electronics.
Resource-based industries such as rubber and petroleum products industries can also provide a cushion to the economy when the electronics sector turns unfavourable. On account of higher oil and gas prices, the share of mining in exports increased from 6.4 per cent in 1996 to 9.8 per cent in 2005.
Direction of exports
The standard policy instruments in dealing with an external slowdown are mainly through the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. A fiscal stimulus package, which mainly involves public works projects, is implemented to stabilise the economy during periods of weak external demand. This step could also be taken when the private sector is underperforming. The problem is that public projects may require time to be effective due to problems and delays in land acquisition and the tendering process.
Recognising the slow pace of projects taking off, the government has stepped up efforts to improve its delivery system. Payments are to be made soon after the completion of projects.
Export composition
In fact, the federal government has had budget deficits since the 1998 crisis, but it has narrowed them due to consolidation measures undertaken. According to the Ministry of Finance (2006), the fiscal deficit reached a high of 5.7 per cent of GDP in 1999, but it declined to 3.8 per cent of GDP in 2005, thanks to higher revenue amid moderate spending. The fiscal deficit is estimated to have declined further to 3.5 per cent in 2006, a level that will foster economic growth without imposing strains on the government's budget. The conduct of monetary policy will balance the need to contain inflation, while providing a conducive environment for growth. Interest rates have been close to historical lows to encourage private consumption and investment activities, but had increased recently due to rising inflationary pressures.
With measures taken to reform the banking system, restructure bad debts, contain non-performing loans (NPLs) and instil better credit management practices, banks are now operating on a more solid footing (IMF 2001) . Largely due to measures taken during the crisis period, the ratio of NPLs to total loans fell from 13.6 per cent in 1998 to about 5.8 per cent in 2005 (see Table 9 ). Bank Negara, the central bank, has encouraged bank mergers, and these have largely been market-driven, although the central bank has intervened at times to kick-start the negotiation process and to ensure it proceeds smoothly.
There are rising concerns that the household debt level has been increasing over the years. Although 
High level of reserves
Malaysia's foreign reserves have increased favourably since the crisis, from US$25 billion in 1998 to US$70.5 billion in 2005 (Table 7) , reaching US$86.9 billion in February 2007 (Bank Negara Malaysia, MSB). The latest level of foreign reserves is sufficient to finance 8.1 months of retained imports and is 9.1 times the short-term external debt. The sizeable trade surplus, at 25.4 per cent of GDP in 2005, and continued inflows of FDI, have more than offset outflows and contributed to the rise in foreign reserves since the crisis. Although portfolio flows have been volatile at times, the persistently large trade surpluses have acted as a buffer against reversals in portfolio flows. The accumulation of foreign reserves has stemmed from the favourable trade surplus, but one explanation that also applies to Malaysia is that the level of investment has been reduced significantly relative to savings. This has resulted in a large resource surplus arising from the saving-investment gap (Table 8) .
Bank Negara has said little on the actual level of foreign reserves, except to say that reserves are Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia liquidity in the system could lead to imprudent lending by banks or even asset price inflation, as seen prior to the crisis. This could also lead to the strengthening of the ringgit at an unfavourable rate that could affect export competitiveness.
Bank Negara does not disclose the composition of foreign reserves to the public. Since most of the trade activities are done in US dollars, it is believed that the main reserve currency is the US dollar. With the US dollar weakening against the euro in late 2006, diversifying the reserve composition to euros or other stable currencies could reduce further losses from currency movements. Weighed down by the large and unsustainable US current account deficit, the US dollar is expected to depreciate further over the medium term. The slower growth in the US economy could pressure the dollar to ease further.
After the lifting of the fixed exchange rate of the ringgit on 21 July 2005 to a managed floating regime, the ringgit has appreciated gradually against the US dollar. The ringgit has strengthened by about 7.0 per cent against the US dollar in 2006. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) was quite stable in 2006, inching up by 0.7 per cent. The stronger ringgit was also attributed to renewed foreign interests in the local stock market, as they can simultaneously gain from both the rise in equity prices and a stronger currency. The ringgit is still trailing regional currencies as the latter strengthened even more against the US dollar. Preferably, a gradual appreciation of the ringgit would give time for businesses to adjust to a stronger currency. Although exports might be affected somewhat, cheaper imports of raw inputs and machinery could offset some of the pressures on export prices and domestic inflation.
At the regional level, Malaysia is a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and is involved in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) which has set up a 'collective fund' that member countries can seek assistance from. The CMI is intended to address short-term liquidity problems and complements international financial facilities. Malaysia has a financial commitment of US$300 million in the move to raise the funds of the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) to US$2 billion. However, the amount allocated may not be large enough to handle crises of larger proportions.
The financial sector
The banking sector has gone through fairly extensive restructuring exercises since the 1998 crisis. Banks are healthier, while the soundness of balance sheets has improved after bad loans were taken over by the special purpose vehicle (SPV), Danaharta. Banks started to lend again after disposing of their NPLs. Created during the turmoil of the crisis, Dahanarta wound-up its operation at the end of 2005, after fulfilling its objective of addressing NPL problems in the banking sector. Danaharta had effectively Masterplan (FSMP) prefers liberalisation and deregulation of the financial sector at a gradual phase that will allow domestic banks to adequately prepare for greater competition. Foreign equity ownership in the conventional banking sector is still generally restricted at 30 per cent. Foreign equity limit in Islamic banks has been raised to 49 per cent to encourage participation in this growth area. The policy direction continues to focus on enhancing structural and operational efficiencies of domestic banks. The key suggestions are to increase investment in human capital and promote a customer-oriented culture to support the business models and services which meet customers' needs and demand. Much emphasis has been directed at promoting sound risk management practices and corporate governance standards in the banking industry.
The private banks in Malaysia are mostly marketdriven and are highly profit oriented. However, to encourage finance to areas that are less attractive and more risky, such as agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the government has set up specialised banks to cater for these sectors, categorised as Development Financial Institutions (DFIs). The agriculture bank provides financing to agriculture projects that can only generate returns over the longer period. Apart from loans, the SME bank gives additional business advisory services to help SMEs apply better management practices, expand their businesses, and gain access to the export market.
Bank Negara continues to deregulate and liberalise the banking sector at a gradual pace. Measures were undertaken to promote efficiency and competitiveness of the banking industry and to strengthen the resilience of the financial system. Banks were allowed to diversify their investment activities into unit trusts and derivatives up to a certain limit. Locally incorporated foreign banks were allowed to establish up to four additional branches within a one year period, starting in 2006. Efforts are also directed at strengthening the effectiveness of surveillance to detect emerging vulnerabilities and weaknesses that undermine financial stability. Bank Negara has come up with some assessments regarding the readiness of banking institutions for Basel II. Four key principles are adopted by Bank Negara as strategies to Basel II implementation (Bank Negara Malaysia 2005). These are as follows:
1 Ensuring that risk management standards among all banking institutions are improved over time.
2 Adoption of a more flexible timeframe that allows for the implementation of capacity building measures, recognising that domestic players are at different levels of sophistication, thus more time should be accorded to institutions intending to adopt the more advanced approaches.
3 Implementation should not be based on regulatory mandate. The adoption of advanced approaches should be supported by strong business justification.
4 Ensuring a more effective supervisory process for the adoption of more advanced approaches. This will be achieved through better supervisory practices to assess internal models and advanced risk management systems.
The adoption of Basel II in Malaysia is in line with the overall direction of policy to promote higher standards of risk management among the Malaysian banks in facing greater competition from liberalisation. However, there are challenges and obstacles to overcome such as getting standardised quality data from banking institutions. This will require an internal set up that can capture the required information.
Since the imposition of capital controls in 1998, which has largely been relaxed over time, the Malaysian currency, the ringgit, still does not have legal tender outside the country. Therefore, the ringgit is still noninternationalised and cannot be traded in offshore markets. The reason for limiting the ringgit to the domestic market was based on the experience during the crisis when offshore trading in Singapore had exacerbated speculative pressures on local financial markets. Stock counters that were previously traded in Singapore were also discontinued as a means to contain external pressures.
Even after switching to a managed float regime in July 2005, the ringgit was still not traded offshore. In March 2007, Bank Negara relaxed some rules on foreign exchange trading to enhance activity and reduce transaction costs in the financial sector. The limit on foreign exchange transactions for local banks has been removed and limits on foreign currency accounts were lifted. The central bank governor has remarked that Malaysia will assess the benefits and risks of ringgit internationalisation, and even proposed partial liberalisation as an option. If offshore ringgit trading is allowed, the currency will be exposed to greater volatility and speculative risks, and monetary policy could be rendered less effective. On the positive side, allowing the market to determine the ringgit's value will bring it closer to its equilibrium value, notwithstanding the occasional overshooting. A more liberalised ringgit will improve Malaysia's image, which was tarnished by having capital controls previously. Given the painful past experience in 1998 and the recent speculative burst on the Thai baht in late 2006, it is likely that Malaysia will take a cautious stance on this issue. Even without offshore ringgit trade, foreign inflows have brightened up in early 2007 and the ringgit has reached a 13-year high recently. Without clear benefits more than offsetting the costs, this could mean that offshore trading of the ringgit will come later rather than sooner.
4 Capital flows/capital account Private flows continue to feature significantly in the capital account. However, due to the persistently sizeable trade surpluses since 1998, the current account continues to record surpluses which more than compensate for occasionally large outflows of private short-term funds. The merchandise balance (or the goods balance) has been in surplus of more than 20 per cent of GNP since 1998 (Table 7) . This has provided ample cushion against the more volatile short-term flows. There is less fear that outflows will impact on the foreign reserves due to steady and sizeable export earnings and FDI inflows. More positively, FDI flows were not restricted during the capital control period of the crisis and they remain free of restrictions to move in and out of the country. It is foreseen that Bank Negara will continue to deregulate the flows of local funds to allow them to diversify their investments and try to seek better returns in foreign markets. This will come with some risks since local fund managers are not familiar with foreign markets, but the risks can be reduced by investing through foreigners who are well-informed of their own markets.
Vulnerabilities originating from internal imbalances
The federal government fiscal deficit reached a high of 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2000 (Table 10 ). At the height of the crisis, the government embarked on a counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus when the private sector was badly affected. The expansionary fiscal policy stayed on because the private sector needed time to recover. The restructuring that took place in the private sector resulted in decline in investment activities. Flexibility in public spending is still needed to support the economy due to the slow pace in private sector recovery and the sometimes uncertain external demand. The policy is for fiscal consolidation to progress gradually, while maintaining a moderate GDP growth pace. A somewhat worrying concern is that Malaysia's fiscal deficit is larger than that of its neighbours such as Thailand and Indonesia, which have been under stricter IMF conditions.
As far as policy is concerned, the reduction in fiscal deficit will proceed at a pace that will not undermine economic activity. The government will continue to practice prudent financial management, giving more focus to greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in public spending. On the back of strong private sector growth and higher oil-related revenues, the active fiscal stimulus is not expected to undermine the budget consolidation efforts. Capital controls have been relaxed over time and local funds are allowed to move abroad, though only up to a certain limit. The ban on ringgit offshore is likely to stay for a while given the cautious stand of the government in view of the volatility in regional currencies. The uptrend in the stock market in early 2007, driven in part by greater foreign interests, has simultaneously strengthened the ringgit as investors try to profit from both the equity and currency appreciation. The risks of sudden reversals have been mitigated by the larger reserve position.
The GDP growth pace is now at a more moderate level of around 5-6 per cent, reducing concerns of overheating which was a main issue during the crisis. The growth rate is more sustainable since it is close to the estimated potential growth path of 6.0-6.5 per cent. Malaysia is unlikely to return to the rapid growth pace of more than 9.0 per cent as in the past, given the constantly changing and more challenging global economic landscape. The increasing global competition is making it more difficult to attract FDI and expand the export market. Moreover, the private sector is investing more cautiously following the restructuring episode after the crisis, and the fiscal deficit is a constraint on government spending.
On the positive side, the current account has continuously recorded surpluses since 1999, and this has contributed to the increase in foreign reserves. Although portfolio flows continue to have a significant impact on the capital account of the BoP, the large trade surplus helps cushion the outflows. There are structural concerns over the heavy reliance on electronics exports, thus exposing the Malaysian economy to fluctuations in the electronics cycle. The higher oil and gas prices and primary commodities, such as palm oil and rubber, in 2006 have contributed favourably to export revenue, partly acting as a buffer to the changes in electronics demand.
The government is making efforts to diversify the economy further by promoting sectors that have growth potentials such as tourism, bio-tech and Islamic financial services. More importantly, there is greater focus on enhancing human capital with plans to upgrade the quality of education at all levels and to encourage constant retraining of workers. A highpowered investment committee, comprising of ministers and high-ranking officials, has been formed to ensure timely approval of high-impact FDI applications. An implementation agency has been set up to make sure that public projects under the 9MP proceed according to the planned timeframe.
In general, the financial sector has become more resilient following the bank mergers and the restructuring measures, including better risk management practices being put in place. Loan growth has moderated to a more sustainable level, although bank loans are still the main source of funding in the economy. The bond market is still undergoing further development. The mergers have reduced the number of banks in the system and their capital-base is much larger than before, making them more resilient to crisis. Asset quality has improved, NPLs have been brought down and credit systems have been improved.
Private consumption has been resilient so far, but it may moderate in view of the increase in the living costs arising from the cut in oil subsidy. The fiscal stimulus can only offer a limited cushion to the looming external weaknesses. As a note of caution, there are downside risks to Malaysia's growth prospects. The precarious global imbalance, as reflected by the huge and growing US current account deficit, could force a major slide in the US dollar. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to a downturn in the US economy and the spill over effects can de-rail China's growth momentum. The softening demand in primary markets such as the USA has partly been compensated by the expansion in secondary markets involving intra-Asian trade. Malaysia has grown less sensitive to the USA and more sensitive to East Asia, especially China, in recent times.
